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ABSTRACT 
We describe a representation and a set of inference methods that combine logic 
programming techniques with probabilistic network representations for 
uncertainty (influence diagrams). The techniques emphasize the dynamic 
construction and solution of probabilistic and decision-theoretic models for 
complex and uncertain domains. Given a query, a logical proof is produced if 
possible; if not, an influence diagram based on the query and the knowledge of 
the decision domain is produced and subsequently solved. A uniform 
declarative, first-order, knowledge representation is combined with a set of 
integrated inference procedures for logical, probabilistic, and decision-theoretic 
reasoning. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in representation and inference under uncertainty for artificial 
intelligence have stressed the utility of network representations. Alternative representations for 
probabilistic inference include influence diagrams, developed by decision analysts (Howard 
and Matheson, 1981), and the related formalism of Bayes networks (Pearl, 1986). Though 
there appears to be some agreement on graphical depictions of dependencies for uncertainty in 
AI, much less attention has been devoted to the generation or construction of these structures. 
Most researchers focus on the procedures for propagating information and manipulating 
structures for given diagram (Pearl, 1986; Henrion, 1986; Shachter, 1986b; Shenoy, Shafer, 
and Melloui, 1986). 
This paper develops techniques designed to allow reasoning about the structure of a 
probabilistic or decision-theoretic model as opposed to reasoning with a given model. The 
objective is to provide a representation, a set of inference techniques, and ·an architecture which 
can support �ynarnic construction and solution to a probabilistic model in response to a query 
and domain knowledge. Given a query, the basic idea is to produce a logical proof if possible; 
if not, the knowledge of the decision domain is searched to find information which defines a 
probabilistic or decision-theoretic model for the query. This model is produced and 
subsequently solved. The approach developed here has the following advantages over previous 
approaches: 
• Probabilistic reasoning is gracefully integrated with logical, deterministic 
inference. This allows one to invoke the appropriate richness of 
representation for different problems based on information availability and 
desired solution methodology. 
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• The expressiveness of the language does not impose assumptions of 
conditional independence on the probabilistic representation. The knowledge 
base can therefore express the set of dependencies and independencies made 
explicit by the system builder and/or decision maker. 
• Through the dynamic construction of models in response to queries and as the 
state of information in the knowledge base changes, the size of probabilistic 
models is minimized. 
• The system is capable of construction of multiple models for the same 
phenomena. This allows reasoning about the performance and results of 
different models within the same environment. 
• By formulating logical, probabilistic, and decision-theoretic inference within 
an integrating framework , techniques of explanation and heuristic search can 
be applied to the construction of probabilistic and decision-theoretic models. 
II. REPRESENTING DECISION DOMAINS WITH PROBABILITIES 
In this section a declarative language based on first-order predicate calculus is described 
for representing decision domains. The language allows the expression of the logical and 
probabilistic relationships in the domain, as well as the information flows, alternatives, and 
objectives inherent in decision making contexts. Influence diagrams, graphical depictions for 
decision problems used in decision analysis, are then briefly presented. 
A. Propositions 
The decision domain is represented with a set of propositions of the form (P Xl x2 .. x0) 
where the P is a relational constant and the Xi are variables or object constants. Given the 
overall structure of the proposition (i.e. its relational constant and arity), there are three levels 
of knowledge possible regarding a proposition. 
First, there may be a fact stored in the knowledge base regarding regarding a 
proposition. Thus (WEATHER RAINY SATURDAY) represents the belief under certainty 
(not subject to updating) that the weather was rainy on Saturday. 
At a second level, the possible instantiations of a proposition are restricted to a specified 
set. This is acheived by associating a set of alternative values with particular variables in a 
proposition. The alternative values are the set of mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive 
values for that variable in the proposition. The alternative values set is a means of restricting 
the possible values a variable can take on in a proposition. 
Consider the WEATHER proposition (WEATHER x y) where x and y are variables. 
Let x be a restricted variable with its outcomes restricted to the set {FAIR, CLOUDY, 
RAINY}. Let y be a free, unrestricted variable. Then the only possible values for x in weather 
are FAIR, CLOUDY, or RAINY. Furthermore for any y, exactly one of the assertions 
(WEATHER FAIR y), (WEATHER CLOUDY y) , and (WEATHER RAINY y) can be true. 
These expressions will be referred to as the alternative outcomes of the proposition. A 
proposition with restricted variables is a restricted proposition and is written (WEATHER 
{FAIR, CLOUDY, RAINY} y). The alternative outcomes of a conjunction are the members of 
the cross product of the alternative outcomes for the component propositions. 
The third level of information regarding a restricted proposition is expressed as a 
measure of belief over the alternative outcomes of the proposition. Specifically, a probability 
distribution maps each alternative outcome to a probability. Since the alternative outcomes 
are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the sum of the probabilities is one. The 
probability distribution for the proposition (WEATHER {FAIR, CLOUDY, RAINY} 
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RAINY} MONDAY) might be: 
(WEA 'IHER FAIR MONDAY) 
(WEA'IHER CLOUDY MONDAY) 
(WEA'IHER RAINY MONDAY) 
=> 
=> 
=> 
0.7 
0.2 
0.1 
Note that probability distributions can only be specified for those propositions for which 
alternatives sets have been specified. Although a probability provides less information than the 
assertion of a fact, it requires a larger amount of information in the system since all possible 
outcomes must be enumerated. 
B. Influences 
Influences are well formed formulas in the language and take on one of the following 
forms: A�B. AlpB = 1tp(COAicOB). or AliB. All variables which are not restricted are 
· universally quantified. For each formula, A is a single proposition, and B is a conjunction of 
zero or more propositions. 
An influence of the form A�B is a logic influence. It expresses a standard Horn 
clause conditional - If B is true then conclude A to be true. 
An influence of the form AlpB = 1tp(COAICOB) is a probabilistic influence. It is a 
generalization of the logic influence. It expresses the conditional probability distribution for the 
possible outcomes of the restricted proposition A. Thus, for each alternative outcome of B 
(written as COB), it provides the probability distribution over the alternative outcomes for A 
(written as co A). The first expression AlpB expresses the existence of a dependence; 1tp(COAICOB) is the conditional distribution which provides the numerical values for the distribuuon. Note 
that in general, B is conjunction of the form B 1 A B2 A . ... A B0• Some of the Bi are restricted 
propositions others are not. 1tp(COAICOB) provides the conditional probability over the alternative 
outcomes of A given each possible combination of alternative outcomes for the Bi which are 
restricted propositions. For example, 
(WEATHER x TOMORROW) lp (WEA'IHER y TODAY) 
= 1tp(CO(WEATHER x TOMORROW)ICO(WEATHER yTODAY)  
asserts that the distribution of outcomes for xe {FAIR,CLOUDY,SUNNY} is provided for 
each possible outcome of (WEATHER y YESTERDAY). We could condition on more 
information, perhaps a forecast is also available. 
(WEA'IHER x TOMORROW) lp (WEA'IHER y TODA Y)A(FORECAST z TODAY) 
= 1tp(CO(WEATHER x TODA Y)ICO(WEATHER y TODA Y).CO(FORECAST z TODAY)  
Suppose there is another set of conditions which would change the distribution for 
(WEATHER x TODAY). If there is a temperature inversion, then an alternative influence can 
be expressed: 
(WEA 'IHER x TOMORROW) lp (INVERSION TODAY)A(WEA'IHER y TODAY) 
I 
:: 1tp (CO(WEATHER x TOMORROW)ICO(WEATHER y TODAY)  
Here (INVERSION TODAY) is treated deterministically. It expresses the condition, assumed 
to be known with certainty (or not) under which xp' should be used to express the uncertainty 
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regarding (WEATHER x TODAY). If (INVERSION TODAY) is false, then one of the other 
influences can be used. 
An influence of the form Ali B is an informational influence. An influence of this 
form asserts that the restricted proposition A is a decision proposition, i.e. the restricted 
variables in the proposition are under the control of the decision maker. The alternative 
outcomes for the proposition are interpreted in this context as the alternative choices facing the 
decision maker. This influence expresses the informational availability at the time of the 
decision - specifically the outcomes of the restricted variables in B are known at the time the 
decision regarding A is made. 
(ACTIVITY x TOMORROW) li (WEATHER y TOMORROW) 
If the alternative values for x are {PICNIC, WORK, SLEEP} then the influence above says 
that when the decision regarding ACTMTY is made, we know the outcome for WEATHER. 
A decision domain represented in terms of these constructs consists of a set of 
propositions and influences expressing beliefs, uncertainties, dependencies and information 
flows. 
C. Influence Diagrams 
Influence diagrams are network depictions of decision situations (Howard and 
Matheson, 1981) developed as a tool for model construction and representation in decision 
analysis. Each node in the diagram represents an uncertain variable or a decision variable. 
There is a single node which designated as the value node. This node's variable (real valued) 
will be maximized or minimized in expected value when solving for optimal decisions. Links 
between nodes provide a graphical depiction of probabilistic independence and information 
flows. The formalism of Bayes networks (Pearl, 1986) are similar constructs which express 
probabilistic dependencies, but do not have a representation for preferences or decisions. 
Recently there has been attention devoted to influence diagrams based on providing a 
complete description of a decision problem. In addition to representing the structure of a 
decision model , information characterizing the nature and content of nodes and links is 
attached to the diagram. The diagram then provides a precise specification of a decision 
maker's preferences, probability assessments, decision alternatives, and states of information. 
The diagrammatic representations can be directly manipulated to perform probabilistic inference 
and to generate decision-theoretic recommendations (Shachter,1986a and 1986b). It is this 
ability to manipulate the diagram directly in order to perform Bayesian inference (equivalent to 
reversing an arc), forming conditional expectation (equivalent to removing a chance node), and 
maximize expected utility (equivalent to removing a decision node) which will be utilized in the 
inference systems developed below. 
Ill. OVERVIEW OF INFERENCE METHODS 
As outlined in the previous section, there are three levels of knowledge regarding a 
proposition: a fact, a set of possible alternative outcomes for the proposition, and a probability 
distribution over those alternative outcomes. If assertions in these forms are not explicitly in 
the knowledge base for a given propositional pattern, we may wish to derive them given the 
sentences in the knowledge base. Below, this inference process is described for a probabilistic 
query, i.e. fmd the probability distribution over alternative outcomes for a proposition (A t1 t2 
.. .. tk) where the ti are variables or constants. The general scheme is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Query Distribution or Expectation 
�r f 
Influence ~ � Influence Declarative Domain � Diagram � Diagram Description Theorem Solver Prover 
Figure 1 - Overview of Inference 
The process starts with a query, for example, "What is the probability distribution over 
the alternative values for t1 and t2 in (A t1 t2 1)?". Given this query and the set of sentences 
comprising the declarative domain description, the inference procedure builds an influence 
diagram with a node representing the query as its root. This influence diagram is subsequently 
solved by reducing the diagram to a single node with no predecessors to provide the probability 
distribution over the alternative outcomes for A, the answer to the query. 
A. Probabilistic Inference 
Inference is initiated by a identifying an initial goal (the query), Go= (P t1 t2 .... tk), and an 
empty influence diagram, N. The proof procedure will search the set of expressions in the 
decision domain to either 1) logically derive deterministic conclusions regarding the goal or 2) 
to construct the appropriate probabilistic model that will satisfy the goal. From the initial goal 
Go, a successful proof will generate a sequence of goals G1 to G0 where G0 is empty. A 
transformation to a successive goal may add a node to the influence diagram N. The conclusion 
of a successful proof results in a well-formed influence diagram constructed during the 
procedure, and an answer substitution 9 providing the bindings on the variables in the original 
goal.l The transformations of goal states proceeds as follows. 
Let Gi be a conjunction of the form PIA P2A..A PkA .... A Pm, and let N be the set of 
nodes in an influence diagram. Select some Pk as a sub goal. Then a new goal Gi+ 1 can be 
derived from Gi if one of the following conditions hold. · 
i.) Pk is logically derivable from the set of formulas of the form A�B by standard Horn 
clause logical inference, with answer substitution 9i+l· Then 
Gi+l = (PtA P2A .. A Pk-tAPk+l····A Pm)9i+l 
Thus if a sub goal is known in the database or is provable using a logic proof procedure, it can 
be removed from the list of subgoals. In this way the procedure described here fully 
subsumes Horn clause logical inference. 
1 A substitution 9 is a set of the form {xiitt,x2ft2, ..... xn/t0} where the Xi are variables and the 
ti are variables, constants, or alternative value sets as defmed in the text. The expression P9 is 
the proposition P with ti substituted for all occurrences of Xi in P. If P9 = Q9 then P and Q are 
said to unify and 9 is a unifier. 
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ii.) There exists a node Nj in N and a substitution ei+l such that Nj 6i+t= P:k6i+l.Then 
Gi+l = (PtA P2A .. A Pk-tAPk+t .... A Pm)6i+l 
In this step, we check if the particular subgoal has already been accounted for in the influence 
diagram N. If there is already a node in the diagram which unifies with the subgoal, then the 
subgoal can be removed from the list of subgoals. An arc is added to the diagram from Nj to 
the node created when the subgoal was added to the subgoal list (see Step iv. below). 
iii.) There exists a probability distribution 1tp(COA) for a proposition A and a substitution 6i+l 
such that A ei+t= P:k6i+l· Then 
Gi+l = (PtA P2A .. A Pk-tAPk+J .... A Pm)6i+l 
The set of chance nodes in the diagram N is augmented with node labeled Aei+1 and 
probability distribution 1tp(COA6i+0· The new node represents the prior probability on the 
proposition, and the node in the diagram has no predecessors. Its successor is that node that 
was created when the subgoal was added to the subgoal list . A node that encodes the available 
information about the subgoal has been added to the diagram, therefore the subgoal can be 
removed from the list of subgoals. This step is analogous to unification with a fact in a logic­
based system. 
iv.) There exists an influence of the form AlpB = 1tp(COAICOB) where B is a conjunction of the 
form QlA (hA .. A Qn and a substitution ei+l such that A ei+t= P:k6i+l·Then 
Gi+l =(PtA P2A .. A Pk-lAQlA Q2A .. A Q0APk+l .... A Pm)ei+l. 
This is the backwards chaining step in the procedure. The set of chance nodes in the diagram N 
is augmented with node labeled Aei+ 1 and conditional probability distribution 1tp(COAICOB), 
relating A to the restricted variables in B. The new goal, Gi+h has been extended with the 
propositions in the antecedent of the influence. Each of these new subgoals are associated with 
the new node Aei+l• since any node created as a result of these new subgoals will have Aei+l 
as a successor. 
The probabilistic proof procedure is successful when a derived goal Gn is empty. The 
answer substitution for the proof is the composition of the substitutions found at each step 
e 1 62 ... 60• The resulting influence diagram N (if non-empty) is then manipulated to derive the 
desired distribution or expectation. The manipulation consist of removing all nodes in the 
diagram except that associated with the original goal Go, possibly with some arc reversals 
(applications of Bayes rule). The probability distribution in the single remaining node is the 
probability distribution over the alternative outcomes of the original query (P tt t2 .... tic). 
There are analogous inference techniques for deducing alternative outcomes for 
propositions and for explicit consideration of decision and value nodes in influence diagrams 
with this approach (Breese, 1987). For decision making, the initial goal is a proposition with 
a single real valued variable representing the value to be maximized or minimized. Inference 
proceeds as above, with the consideration of informational influences AliB, the addition of 
decision nodes to the diagram, and a mechanism for associating outcomes of uncertain 
propositions with a value proposition. 
B. Integrating Logical, Probabilistic, and Decision-theoretic Inference 
The representation and inference procedures outlined above integrate logical, 
probabilistic, and decision-theoretic reasoning in several ways. 
First, there is a uniform syntax for logical and probabilistic statements, providing a 
frrst-order language for declaratively describing logical and probabilistic relationships as well 
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as information availability for decisions. This allows knowledge bases to freely intermix 
logical and probabilistic descriptions, without awkward (and frequently incorrect) conversions 
of one to the other. The representation is modular, in that the addition or deletion single 
influence does not impose any assumptions concerning conditional independence of 
propositions as expressed in other influences. This is because a single probabilistic influence in 
this framework requires consideration of all possible alternative values for both antecedent and 
consequent. Attachment of a single number to a logic influence, as in the certainty factor 
representation of uncertainty, does not have this property (Heckerman and Horvitz, 1986). 
The representation allows the system builder to describe the domain, using both probabilistic 
(uncertain) and logic (certain) relationships. 
Logic also provides not only a means of reasoning about the domain of interest, but 
also about how to reason about the structure of probabilistic dependencies in the domain. The 
influence: 
(PROPO SmON-OF-INTEREST x) lp (CONDffiONING-PROPOSmON y) 
A (CONDffiON-FOR-EXP ANSI ON) 
= 7t( O>(PROPOSmON-OF-INTEREST x).CO(CONDffiONING-PROPOSmON y)  
says the probability distribution for PROPOSITION-OF-INTEREST is conditioned on 
CONDITIONING-PROPO SITION. There is an additional requirement that CONDffiON­
FOR-EXPANSION be a known fact or provable from the knowledge base. Thus in order to 
derive the probability distribution of PROPO SITION-OF-INTEREST in terms of 
CONDITIONING-PROPOSmON, CONDffiON-FOR-EXPANSION must be true.2 
This general scheme allows for reasoning about the structure of probabilistic models in 
a rule-based manner based on domain or heuristic information. Most other techniques for 
probabilistic reasoning implicitly rely on a static, prespecified representation of uncertain 
relationships, e.g., a single Bayes network or influence diagram. Though one can envision a 
massive global probabilistic model including all propositions, their possible outcomes, and 
potential dependencies, a model of this type would be extremely cumbersome and inflexible 
with respect to changes in the model description. 
The inference methods admit a precedence in choice of which procedure to use to 
attempt to address a particular subgoal. This precedence implies a control structure for the 
search for probabilistic and decision-theoretic models. Overall, control is focused on 
minimizing the extent of models which explicitly account for uncertainty using probability. 
We first use logic to attempt draw conclusions on any subgoal. If there is information available 
that asserts the categorical truth value of a proposition, then the other possible values can be 
ignored. Another level of control involves the selection of alternative probabilistic 
representations. In the implementation of these methods, the probabilistic inference procedure 
will search for a prior probability distribution (i.e., an influence of the form Alp, no 
conditioning propositions) before attempting to use probabilistic influences of the form AlpB, 
which in general can increase the size of the probabilistic representation. Thus, the scheme 
embodies a search for a minimum size probabilistic model. 
The modular nature of the influences and inference procedures also make it possible to 
obtain multiple probabilistic models of the same phenomena. That is, within a given knowledge 
base it may be possible to construct several probabilistic models which will provide results for 
a proposition of interest. These may represent different conceptions of the world, levels of 
abstraction, or model sizes based on computational considerations. This raises the issue of 
consistency. 
If multiple models or probability distributions are consistent with a single knowledge 
base and query, how can we resolve these differences? One answer is further refmement of the 
2 The construction of any probabilistic model and the assessment of probabilities presumes a 
background state of information or knowledge. The set of logically derivable conclusions from 
the knowledge base at the time of a probabilistic inference make up this state of information. 
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knowledge base to make explicit any conditions under which one representation is preferred to 
another. Similarly, one can construct probabilistic or other representations which embody 
methods for combining information and outputs. The inference methods as currently defined 
do not explicitly have methods for resolving and insuring consistency among the multiple 
models which may be derivable from a knowledge base. However, the overall approach 
provides the ability to generate the multiple models and then allow a higher level authority, 
perhaps the human decision maker, to interpret and integrate the findings. Development of 
explicit and formal methods for reasoning about the use ofalternative models and their 
conclusions is an area of future research. 
IV. SUMMARY 
An integrated first-order for representing logical, probabilistic, and decision-theoretic 
constructs, as well as a set of inference techniques which operate over the language, have been 
developed. Inference is based on the dynamic construction of probabilistic networks for 
generation of probabilistic and decision-theoretic conclusions. The approach allows reasoning 
regarding the domain, as well as reasoning about the construction of a probabilistic or decision­
theoretic model addressing a particular query. 
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